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Summary
Australian social policy is characterised by a program and institutional
divide between welfare income and work income.
ATSIC's CDEP scheme sits astride this divide and has done so for 20 years.
This position astride the welfare/work divide has been a source of both
opportunities and problems for the CDEP scheme.
Opportunities relate to different players, or stakeholders, operating at
different levels with the scheme.
For ATSIC (and the DAA before it) the CDEP scheme has offered the
opportunity of a budget item which is directly offset against social security
expenditure.
For participating organisations, the CDEP scheme has offered the
opportunity of a grant which is notionally linked to a legislative entitlement
and hence less discretionary than many other grants.
For individual participants, the CDEP scheme has offered the opportunity of
not having to comply with two-weekly social security procedures in order to
maintain eligibility and the ability to earn larger amounts of additional
income without loosing eligibility.
The CDEP scheme has also allowed flexible workplace practices to be
developed incorporating indigenous values and social practices.
Problems with and criticisms of the CDEP scheme over the years, have
included undermining award wage employment, substitution for the funding
responsibilities of other government programs, the creation of secondary
labour market conditions and a bias towards indigenous men rather than
women.
Although these problems and criticisms have, to some extent, been
addressed, new versions of problems and criticism tend in time to arise and
persist. This is related to the CDEP scheme's position astride the welfare/
work divide.
Here the focus is on allegations of racial discrimination in comparison to
NSA/YTA recipients, which have arisen in recent years. These allegations
have considerable prima facie credibility and this too relates to the position
of the CDEP scheme astride the welfare/work divide.
Frequently the DSS and other government organisations treat CDEP
participants not as NSA/YTA recipients, but as low income earners. Where
this is to the disadvantage of CDEP participants, because of the links
between CDEP and NSA/YTA in CDEP guidelines, allegations of racial
discrimination can legitimately be made.
The paper also notes that there is one instance in which DSS does treat
CDEP participants as the equivalent of NSA/YTA recipients.
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The final section of the paper suggests that the basic lesson from the CDEP
scheme is that a government program can survive astride the welfare/work
divide, but that it is likely to be beset by fairly considerable ongoing
problems as well as opportunities.
It suggests that the Howard Government's work-for-the-dole scheme will
face similar problems and criticisms about how participants ought to be
treated, though not allegations of racial discrimination. These problems and
criticisms will differ slightly from those encountered by the CDEP scheme
because the work-for-the-dole scheme participants are being placed more on
the welfare side of the welfare/work divide.
It also suggests that, in the longer term, interaction between the two
schemes may be a two way phenomenon, with the work-for-the-dole scheme
possibly having more effects on the CDEP scheme than vice versa.
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Introduction
Australian social policy is characterised by a significant program and institutional
divide. On one side of this divide sit the programs and institutions of income
support or welfare. On the other, sit the programs and institutions of earned
income or work. The rules applying to income derived from each side of this
welfare/work divide are substantially different. Income derived from work is
subject to regulation through employment contracts or industrial awards,
superannuation and workers compensation requirements, and occupational
health and safety requirements. Income derived from welfare is subject to none of
these, but it is subject to other rules such as income or means tests for both
qualification and withdrawal of income support, multiple entitlement exclusions
and basic eligibility rules.
Most government programs sit fairly clearly on one side or the other of this
welfare/work divide. The programs of the Department of Social Security (DSS), for
example, and the education and training course income support programs of the
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) all
sit on the welfare side of the divide. DEETYA's employment subsidy programs, on
the other hand, sit on the workforce side of the divide. So too, more indirectly, do
most other government programs which encourage economic development or
employment. There is one government program, however, which has sat astride
the welfare/work divide for over 20 years and continues to do so. This is the
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme run by the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).
The CDEP scheme was introduced on a small pilot scale by the Fraser
Coalition Government in 1977 in response to the spread of Unemployment Benefit
payments into remote indigenous communities.' The scheme proved immediately
popular, but for some years laboured under a number of budgetary and
administrative problems which inhibited its expansion. In the early 1980s,
around the time when the Hawke Labor Government came to power, these
problems with the scheme were, to some extent, addressed and the scheme began
expanding quite rapidly (see Table 1). By 1991/92 the scheme operated in almost
200 indigenous communities, involved over 20,000 individual participants and
accounted for a third of the ATSIC budget. Since the early 1990s, expansion has
been somewhat more tentative (again see Table 1). Problems and criticisms of the
CDEP scheme have re-emerged, including allegations that the treatment of CDEP
participants by DSS and other administrators of government programs is, in some
ways, racially discriminatory. But the scheme is still very popular with indigenous
communities.
This paper attempts to do four things. First it examines the way in which
the CDEP scheme sits astride the welfare/work divide. Second it looks at the
opportunities which this position astride the divide has provided for the CDEP
scheme, at various levels from organisations to individual participants. Third it
examines the problems and criticisms which the CDEP scheme has endured
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because of its position astride the welfare/work divide, and in particular how the
allegations of racial discrimination in the treatment of CDEP participants relate to
this position. Finally it asks whether there is likely to be any interaction between
or lessons to be drawn from the CDEP scheme for the Howard Government's
work-for-the-dole initiative.
Table 1. CDEP participant numbers and expenditure, 1976-96
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
No. of
communities
participating
1
10
12
17
18
18
18
32
33
38
63
92
130
166
168
185
186
222
252
274
No. of
participants
100
500
800
700
1.300
1.300
1,300
1,700
2,900
4,000
6,000
7,600
10.800
13.800
18.100
20.100
19,900
24,100
27,000
28,400
CDEP
expenditure
0.1
2.0
2.9
3.8
6.9
7.0
7.4
14.2
23.5
27.2
39.5
65.5
98.8
133.2
193.1
204.5
234.4
251.9
278.3
310.5
CDEP as %
of portfolio"
expenditure
0.1
1.6
2.1
2.7
4.3
4.1
3.7
5.8
8.3
9.2
12.0
17.0
22.0
25.0
34.0
32.0
28.0
27.0
29.0
31.0
Note: 'Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs portfolio, formerly Aboriginal Affairs.
Sources: Sanders (1988): ATSIC and DAA Annual Reports various years since
Astride the welfare/work divide
The 'Basic Outline and Guidelines' document, presented to the Commonwealth
Parliament in May 1977. identified the CDEP scheme's first objective as:
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To provide employment opportunities thereby reducing the need for
unemployment benefit for unemployed Aboriginals within the community at a
cost approximating unemployment benefits (Commonwealth Parliamentary
Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1977: 1922).
The document went on to state that grants would be confined to 'remote areas' or
'separate communities' where unemployment was high and 'projects had been
specifically requested by a community'. Grants were to be paid to 'Aboriginal
community councils' or 'clan groups' and were 'not to exceed the total entitlement
of individual members to unemployment benefits', although there was to be some
allowance for 'specific grants' for the 'purchase of materials and equipment'. It
then specified that:
Each community will be encouraged to establish its own method of
remuneration for its members who participate in the project provided that:
(a) all unemployed community members, eligible to apply for unemployment
benefits will be given the opportunity to participate;
(b) each participating community member, provided he contributes the
required minimum hours or satisfies other minimum criteria determined by
the community, will be guaranteed a minimum income approximating his
normal unemployment benefit entitlement (Commonwealth Parliamentary
Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1977: 1922).
In 1991, Unemployment Benefits were replaced within the Social Security
Act by Job Search Allowance (JSA) and Newstart Allowance (NSA) and in 1995
these, in turn, were replaced for 16 and 17 year olds by Youth TrainingAllowance
(YTA). Reflecting these changes, the 1995 ATSIC guidelines for CDEP stated that:
CDEP is a community development/employment program for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander communities which is funded by the Department of
Finance as a partial off-set against unemployment benefit.
To participate in CDEP, persons who are entitled to receive, or who actually
receive payment of Job Search Allowance (JSA), Newstart Allowance (NSA) or
Youth Training Allowance (YTA) elect to forego the DSS allowance and work for
wages which are paid from a government grant to the community (ATSIC
1995: Division C, Chapter I).2
Both these sets of guidelines indicate very clearly that the CDEP scheme is
an employment program. So participants in the scheme, and income derived from
it, could be expected to be subject to the normal rules and regulations of
employment or wage income. Yet both sets of guidelines also very clearly link
participation in the CDEP scheme with eligibility for unemployment-related
income support payments. From this, we might expect the normal rules of income
support/welfare to apply. So the CDEP scheme sits astride the welfare/work
divide and questions of how normal work and welfare rules apply to CDEP
participants and income remain somewhat unclear, at least from these general
guidelines.
This position astride the welfare/work divide has been a source of both
opportunities and problems for the CDEP scheme. The opportunities have, in
many ways, outweighed the problems; and this is reflected in the scheme's growth
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since the mid 1980s. But the problems have also been significant and need to be
understood.
Opportunities
The opportunities which this position astride the welfare/work divide has
presented for the CDEP scheme can be analysed in relation to different players, or
stakeholders, operating at different levels within the scheme. Three different levels
of stakeholders can be usefully identified; the promoting department or
organisation (which was initially the Commonwealth Department ofAboriginal
Affairs (DAA) and in 1990 became ATSIC), the Aboriginal community councils
(which are recipients of CDEP grants) and the individual CDEP participants.
For the DAA/ATSIC, the CDEP scheme has offered the opportunity of a
budget item which has been seen by governments as directly offset against social
security expenditure. This has allowed ATSIC, and the DAA before it, to argue
strongly for the build up of the CDEP scheme over time and also for some
flexibility within annual CDEP budgeting. This has been a major resource for the
DAA/ATSIC within Canberra bureaucratic politics, strengthening it in relations
with the Department of Finance, as well as with governments of the day and their
budgetary processes. It has been difficult, if not indeed impossible, for
governments and the Department of Finance to resist arguments that expansion
of the CDEP scheme would be largely offset by social security savings and that
indigenous communities which wanted to be able to participate in the scheme,
instead of receiving social security payments, ought to be able to. Hence, the
CDEP scheme's increasing prominence over the years as a proportion of the
DAA/ATSIC budget (see Table 1).
The second level at which the CDEP scheme has offered opportunities to
stakeholders has involved recipient organisations. Most of these organisations
rely for funding on discretionary government grants. However, with the CDEP
scheme, the element of discretion in the allocation of government grants is
considerably reduced, if not indeed eliminated. These are social security
payments in a slightly different form, the argument runs, and as such they are
legislative entitlements rather than discretionary grants. Given the links in the
CDEP scheme's guidelines to the welfare side of the welfare/work divide, this
argument too is difficult to resist. So CDEP becomes an almost guaranteed non-
discretionary form of funding for participating organisations which greatly
strengthens these organisations in their dealings with ATSIC, and also to a lesser
extent with other government funding agencies.
The CDEP scheme also offers opportunities at the level of individual scheme
participants. Procedurally, participants are spared the need to comply with two-
weekly social security procedures in order to demonstrate their ongoing
compliance with the finer points of eligibility for NSAor YTA, such as being willing
and available to undertake suitable work. Instead participants are placed on a
three-monthly ATSIC-administered CDEP participant schedule, which is cross-
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checked with DSS records only for such gross eligibility issues as instances of
double payment.
More substantively, CDEP guidelines are far more generous than NSA and
YTA guidelines in allowing additional income to be earned while still retaining
eligibility. On CDEP, the ATSIC guidelines state, one can earn:
a maximum gross weekly income of two times the weekly remote per
participant rate from permanent part-time work from sources other than
CDEP wage component funds before becoming ineligible for CDEP (ATSIC
1995, Division C, 1.4.8.1).
As the remote per participant rate for the CDEP scheme is currently around $170
per week, this allows CDEP participants, theoretically, to earn up to an additional
$340 per week without losing their CDEP entitlement. On NSA, by contrast,
payment starts to be reduced by 50 cents in every dollar of additional income
earned above $60 per week.
Recent data from the 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Survey (NATSIS) suggests that this opportunity to earn additional income while
on CDEP is being utilised. The income distribution of those who identified
themselves in the NATSIS as CDEP participants was significantly higher than
those who identified as unemployed; though not as high as those who identified
as employed outside the CDEP scheme (seeTable 2). The median income for
CDEP participants was $11,271 compared to $7,278 for unemployed (again see
Table 2).
Another major opportunity offered by the CDEP scheme has been to enable
recipient organisations to provide flexible, culturally-sensitive working
environments. Under the scheme's guidelines, workplaces have been able to
incorporate and reflect many indigenous values and social practices, rather than
strain against them. This has made CDEP scheme employment more attractive to
some indigenous people than other employment settings (see Smith 1994: 18-19,
22-23, 1996: 15-16). It has, in the process, also strengthened the position of the
recipient indigenous organisations.
All these are significant opportunities that the CDEP scheme has offered, at
various levels, to stakeholders and participants. They largely explain the
popularity of the scheme among indigenous people, indigenous organisations, and
the indigenous affairs policy community. All these opportunities are related to the
position of the scheme astride the welfare/work divide. They each draw on both
the income support and the employment aspects of the scheme. However, this
position astride the welfare/work divide has also been a source of problems and
criticisms for the CDEP scheme, the most recent and prominent of which have
been allegations of racial discrimination in the treatment of CDEP participants by
the DSS and other government agencies.
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Table 2. Income distribution of indigenous people aged 15-64, by labour
force status, 1994
Income $
per annum
0-3,000
3,000-8,000
8,000-12,000
12,000-16,000 Percent
16,000-20,000 distribution
20,000-25,000
25,000-30,000
30,000-35,000
35,000-40,000
40,000+
Total
Number
Mean income
Median income
Unemployed
12.2
44.2
20.8
16.4
3.7
2.2
0.4
0.1
100.0
39,748
$8,290
$7,278
Labour Force Status
CDEP employed
0.2
25.7
29.5
17.2
16.4
6.0
3.1
1.2
0.1
0.5
100.0
16,364
$12,641
$11,271
Other
employed
0.9
4.3
8.5
8.8
13.9
23.0
18.0
9.7
5.6
7.4
100.0
46.575
$24,128
$22,971
Source: NATSIS unit record file3
Problems and criticisms
Despite its popularity, the CDEP scheme has suffered many problems and
criticisms over the years. In the early years it was accused of underminingaward
wage conditions and of not being able to guarantee participants the equivalent of
their social security entitlements. It has been accused of being a substitution
funding regime, allowing other government agencies and programs to avoid what
would otherwise be their funding responsibilities. It has also been accused of
creating secondary labour market conditions for indigenous Australians and of
discriminating against indigenous women in favour of indigenous men(see
Altman and Sanders 1991).
Many of these problems and criticisms have, over the years, been at least
partly addressed. But equally, they seem never entirely to go away. Problems and
criticisms keep re-emerging in new guises. Why, for example, are CDEP scheme
participants exempt from superannuation requirements when other employees
are not? This continual re-emergence of problems and criticisms relates in part to
the position of the CDEP scheme astride the welfare/work divide. Because the
scheme has links to both sides of this divide, it is always possible to argue that
CDEP participants ought to be treated differently than they are.
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Allegations of racial discrimination
The latest form of criticism of the CDEP scheme is a stream of complaints to
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) alleging that
CDEP participants are being racially discriminated against in their treatment by
DSS and other government agencies. The basis of these allegations lies in the fact
that the CDEP scheme is only open to indigenous people and that although in the
ATSIC guidelines CDEP participants are equated with NSA/YTA recipients, in
practice they are not treated this way by the DSS or other government agencies.
This sometimes disadvantages indigenous CDEP participants in comparison to
NSA/YTA recipients in gaining access to government and even non-government
services; and hence the allegations of racial discrimination.
These allegations of discrimination do have considerable prima facie
credibility. The DSS does not treat CDEP participants in the same way as
NSA/YTA recipients, but rather treats them, in all but one instance, as low-
income wage earners. While low-income wage earners can qualify for many
elements of DSS income support, they do not always do so on the same basis as
NSA/YTA recipients. For example, a low income wage earner without dependent
children (and without eligibility for any DSS payment) cannot qualify for DSS rent
assistance; whereas an equivalent NSA/YTA recipient can. Similarly an NSA
recipient over 60 who has been in receipt of income support for 12 months
qualifies for a Pensioner Concession Card, whereas an equivalent CDEP
participant/low-income wage earner does not. In the income tax assessment
system, NSA/YTA recipients can qualify for a beneficiary tax rebate, whereas
CDEP participants, as low income wage earners, cannot.
These differences in treatment may seem minor, and they are not always to
the disadvantage of CDEP participants.4 But where they are to the disadvantage
of CDEP participants, a strong case can be made that they are racially
discriminatory. That case for racial discrimination relates to the position of the
CDEP scheme astride the welfare/work divide. For it is the link that is made in
the CDEP scheme's guidelines between CDEP participation and eligibility for
social security payments which opens the way for and gives credence to the
argument that CDEP participants ought to be treated in the same way as
NSA/YTA recipients.
As noted above, there is one instance in which CDEP participants are
formally recognised as the equivalent of NSA/YTA recipients. This arises from
Section 614A of the Social Security Act which states thatNSA:
is not payable to a person for period if that person has received, or may
receive, income for that period that is paid by a community or group from
funds provided under a Commonwealthfunded employment program.
Clarifying this final phrase, section 23 (1) of the Social Security Act states that a
Commonwealth funded employmentprogram is:
a Commonwealth program of funding to a community or group where the
funding is based wholly or partly, on the number of people in that community
or group who are, or are likely to be, qualified for new start allowance.
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These two provisions of the Social Security Act were added in 1991 specifically to
deny CDEP participants the theoretical ability of perhaps qualifying for part
JSA/NSA payment while on CDEP.5 In the language of the Social Security Act,
CDEP participants were, through these two new sections, subject to a 'multiple
entitlement exclusion'; that is they could not receive two similarly-based
entitlements to income support at the same time. The CDEP scheme was, for the
first time, being recognised within the Social Security Act as the formal equivalent
of an income support payment. If CDEP income had been treated totally as wages,
on the employment side of the divide, this multiple entitlement exclusion would
not have been necessary. CDEP participants would simply have qualified for
JSA/N3A on the basis of whether they met the standard eligibility criteria.
Lessons and interactions
The basic lesson that can be drawn from the CDEP scheme would seem to be that
a government program which attempts to sit astride the welfare/work divide in
Australian social policy, can survive, and even flourish, but that in doing so it will
experience considerable ongoing problems, as well as opportunities. The Howard
Government's work-for-the-dole scheme may not face allegations of racial
discrimination, but it will face problems about how participants ought to be
treated in comparison to others in the community whose employmentand income
circumstances fall more clearly on one side or other of the welfare/work divide.
It appears, from current indications, that participants in the Howard
Government's work-for-the-dole scheme will be more on the welfare side of the
divide than CDEP participants. They will be working for their income support
payments, rather than for a wage payment which is notionally offset against a
social security entitlement, as in the CDEP scheme. But questions about being
treated like employees will still arise, because the work-for-the-dole participants
will be working. Will they be covered by workers compensation rules, occupational
health and safety rules and superannuation rules? And if not, as workers, why
shouldn't they be? The experience of the CDEP scheme suggests that these sorts
issues will not go away. They will plague the work-for-the-dole scheme, as they
have done the CDEP scheme; and this relates to the position of these programs
astride the welfare/work divide.
In the longer term, it may be that the Howard Government's work-for-the-
dole scheme will have effects on the CDEP scheme, more than vice versa. Once a
work-for-the-dole scheme is legislatively established, the question may be asked
why the CDEP scheme remains an essentially non-legislated and informal
program. Why can't it too be clearly legislated, rather than administratively
established and only legislatively recognised through one indirect reference in the
Social Security Act? Another possible interaction may be that indigenous
community organisations who are having trouble getting onto the CDEPscheme—
and there are still more seeking participation in the CDEP scheme than can be
accommodated by ATSIC—may try instead to participate in the general work-for-
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the-dole scheme, and there is no reason why they should not. Interaction between
the schemes could become a quite complex two-way process, with each being
used as both a comparison and standard against which the other isjudged.
Conclusion
The CDEP scheme has survived, and flourished, within Australian social policy,
despite sitting astride a major institutional and program divide between income
derived from welfare and income derived from work. This position astride the
welfare/work divide has presented the CDEP scheme with both opportunities and
problems. While the opportunities appear, in many ways, to have predominated,
the problems and criticisms refuse to go away. This can be related to the position
of the scheme astride the welfare/work divide. Similar, though slightly different,
ongoing problems and criticisms may await the Howard Government's work-for-
the-dole initiative.
Notes
1. Previously Unemployment Benefit payments had been largely kept out of these
communities through interpretations of the eligibility rules which prevailed within
DSS (See Sanders 1985).
2. During 1996,amendments to the Social Security Act did away with JSA, merging it
with NSA.
3. The original official report on the NATSIS findings gave income broken down by main
source of income, rather than by labor force status (SeeAustralian Bureau of
Statistics 1995:55). The mean incomes given in this original report by main source of
income were: earned CDEP $12,403, earned non-CDEP $24,802 and government
payments $9,576. This, however, is a less direct way of examining CDEP participants'
incomes in comparison to unemployed people's incomes than the breakdown by
labour force status used here, as the government payments category under main
source of income includes large numbers of people who are outside the workforce.
The CDEP figures in this table may include some CDEP administrators, as well as
CDEP participants, accounting for the small tail of incomes above $30,000. While this
may push up the CDEP mean slightly, it will not greatly affect the median. Nor does it
detract from the general point about the upward shift in the income distribution from
the unemployed to CDEP participants at much lower levels of income than $30,000.
4. The best example of advantageous treatment is the ability, mentioned above, under
the CDEP scheme guidelines, for CDEP participants to earn more additional income
than NSA recipients, without loosing their basic eligibility. Another example, is that
since July 1995,CDEP participants have been treated by the Abstudy administration
as part-time wage earners, which enables them to qualify for Abstudy living
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allowances. Previously, along with NSA/YTA recipients, CDEP participants could not
qualify for these living allowances because they were deemed to be ineligible through a
multiple entitlement exclusion.
5. In the process of reviewing the social security system in the mid-1980s, Cass (1988:
251) pointed out the theoretical possibility of qualifying for part Unemployment
Benefit while on CDEP. This appears to have precipitated the 1991 amendments. It is
doubtful, however, that this theoretical possibility was ever realised in the period from
1977 to 1991. The idea of CDEP payments and Unemployment Benefit payments
being mutually exclusive appears to have been clearly practised by the DSS from the
beginning of the CDEP scheme, even if it was not clearly spelt out in the social
security legislation.
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